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THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
CREDIT: A PROPOSAL TO REPLACE
SECTION 501(c)(3) TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS
John H. Davies'["
One might be tempted to guess that it is primarily the wealthy
who take advantage of the present charitable contributions deduction.
Recent statistics, however, disclose that this is not the case. In
February 1972, the Treasury Department released preliminary data
for 1970 individual income tax returns. According to the Department,
nearly one half of the approximately $13 billion in charitable deduc-
tions were taken by taxpayers with adjusted gross incomes of less than
$15,000. Even more striking was the disclosure that these lower income
taxpayers paid almost the same percentage of their adjusted gross
income to charity as did their more wealthy counterparts.1
Charitable deductions, as closely as can be estimated, cost the
government at least $4 billion in 1970 individual income tax revenues. 2
It was estimated that taxable income for fiscal year 1971 lost to chari-
table deductions for contributions (other than to educational institu-
tions) amounted to over $3.5 billion. The only tax expenditure item
which exceeded this amount during fiscal year 1970-71 was for non-
business state and local taxes.3 Given such enormous costs each year,
Congress should begin to wonder whether taxpayers really are getting
their money's worth. Surprisingly, few have ever questioned the
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University, Camden. B.S. 1963, LL.B. 1965,
University of Illinois; LL.M. 1969, Harvard.
I See U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, PRELiMINARY STATsIcs or INCOMmE: 1970 INDrvmuAL INcoMM
TAX RrruaNs 40 (1972).
2 Id. at 28, 40. This calculation was based upon the information in Tables S and 7
of the report, assuming that the percentage of joint returns to total returns in Table 3
held true for itemized returns in Table 7 as well. Thus, combined rates ranging from
14% to 66% were applied to the charitable contributions for various brackets of adjusted
gross income listed in Table 7. The result, of course, is a very rough estimate. To this
estimate could be added the taxes relating to corporate contributions and, arguably, a
portion of the standard deduction to arrive at a figure approaching the total federal
income tax cost.
A broader estimate of $6 billion for 1967, reported in an article by Professor Law-
rence Stone, included estate and gift tax deductions and income tax exemptions of chari-
table organizations. Stone, Federal Tax Support of Charities and Other Exempt Organiza-
tions: The Need for a National Policy, 20 U. So. CAL. 1967 TAX INST. 27, 31 n.13 (1968).
3 117 CONG. REc. S18,764 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1971).
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charitable deduction.4 On May 31, 1972, however, Representative
Wilbur Mills and Senator Mike Mansfield introduced in Congress the
Tax Policy Review bill,5 which would, inter alia, repeal the charitable
deduction unless Congress chose to re-enact it in similar or modified
form. The bill, if enacted, hopefully would be treated as a long
overdue call for a re-examination of the basic policy considerations
upon which the charitable deduction is premised. This article will
examine the policies underlying the federal income tax advantages
for charitable contributions and will develop the thesis that the culprit
is not the deduction but rather the exemption for charitable organi-
zations.
Who should be the primary beneficiaries of any new approach
to these provisions? The wealthy donor can generally take care of him-
self. The very size of his donation gives him some control over what is
done with it. Small donors, however, who deducted gifts of over $6
billion in 1970, have no such power; they may at best select from an
approved list of potential donees or decide not to give at all. One half
of all individual taxpayers took no separate charitable deduction in
1970. These taxpayers were the involuntary donors of a large part
of the $4 billion of lost government revenues." Yet they possessed none
of the powers of selection or control enjoyed by larger, voluntary
4 A few experts have commented generally on the need to subject the deduction to
cost-benefit analysis. See Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treat-
ment of Charitable Contributions, 20 NATL TAX J. 1 (1967); 113 CoNG. REc. 36,404 (1967)
(remarks of Representative Mills). But most of the federal officials who were directly con-
cerned with tax policy in 1968 seemed to be unconcerned. One commentator summarized
the results of personal interviews conducted in 1968 with 35 members of the House Ways
and Means and Senate Finance Committees and 13 officials in the Treasury Department,
Internal Revenue Service, Department of Justice, and President's Council of Economic
Advisers, as follows:
In 1963 the Treasury Department put the "loss" of revenue entailed by the
charitable deduction at about $2.8 billion. Yet none of the respondents seemed to
be unduly concerned about this magnitude. One House leader said, "We can make
it up by raising taxes."
T. HuNTER, THE TAX CLIMATE FOR PHILANTHROPY 68 (1968).
During the hearings which preceded the enactment of the 1969 tax reform legisla-
tion, Chairman Wilbur Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee structured an
agenda that impliedly put such basic questions aside. See Hearings on Tax Reform Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1, at 5-6 (1969) (press re-
lease dated Jan. 29, 1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
5 S. 3657 (H.R. 15230), 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
6 Technically, any donor who deducted amounts which saved him less in taxes than
he would have received had the $4 billion been returned via a tax reduction was, to this
extent, an involuntary donor. However, Congress would probably have instead used the
$4 billion to increase its direct expenditures. Thus, each involuntary donor is entitled to
protection extending to the entire $4 billion from which he would have received an indi-
vidual benefit.
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donors. The government which has required these involuntary dona-
tions has the duty to ensure that these taxpayers are getting their
money's worth.
What is meant by "money's worth"? Most taxpayers probably think
that the $4 billion somehow induced a significant increase in giving to
charity. Studies indicate that this is not so.7 Logic would seem to
support this finding. True, a taxpayer might add to his donation an
amount representing the government's share, but there is no reason
to believe that he would increase his share just because the govern-
ment stands ready to put in four dollars for each nine of his own.
Some residual inducement value does seem to exist outside the area
of strict mathematical logic. A taxpayer may feel that the burden of
the whole gift is lessened by the deduction (and may thus increase his
own share without actually figuring it out), or he may feel that the
extra amount that the government is putting in makes the whole gift
worthwhile. A small number of donors may even be motivated by
the prospect of depriving the government of revenue.
Theoretically, a deduction might also serve as an inducement in
the selection of one charity over another. A taxpayer might, in a dose
case, be induced to give to a government-approved charity rather than
to a charity not favored by Congress in order to trigger the one-for-two
government matching payment. Because a contribution to almost any
charity is deductible if structured properly,8 however, the idea that
the government is trying to influence the selection of certain approved
charities over others reduces itself to a matter of form and a trap for
7 Studies completed in the early 1960's concluded that the incentive value of the de-
duction is minimal. It has been estimated that in 1962 the $22 billion of lost individual
income tax revenue induced only $57 million of extra individual giving. M. Taussig, The
Charitable Contributions Deduction in the Federal Personal Income Tax 142 (1965) (un-
published doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). For a summary
of this dissertation, see Taussig, supra note 4. Studies by two noted economists generally
support this condusion, espedally for taxpayers in middle and lower tax brackets. See
C. KAHN, PERSONAL DEnuCroNs IN Tm FEDEaL INCOME TAx 72 (1960); Vickrey, One Econ-
omist's View of Philanthropy, in PHILANrHROPY AND PUBLIC POLICY 31 (F. Dickinson ed.
1962).
8 The Internal Revenue Code permits a deduction for gifts to certain entities orga-
nized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes. INT. REy. CODE or 1954,
§ 170(c)(2)(B) [hereinafter cited as CODE]. This deduction is permissible regardless of
whether the entity has been approved for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3). The variety
of purposes that qualify as "charitable" is virtually infinite. Deductions have been per-
mitted for contributions to organizations ranging from the Birth Control League of
Massachusetts (see Faulkner v. Commissioner, 112 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1940)), to a trust estab-
lished to make awards to citizens rendering conspicuous service to the community. See Bok
v. McCaughn, 42 F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1930).
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the unwary.9 It is also true that contributions to certain preferred
charities can be deducted up to a higher percentage of adjusted gross
income,'0 but few donors ever approach the unpreferred twenty per-
cent limit, let alone the fifty percent limit for gifts to preferred
charities."
For these reasons, the $4 billion in question is little inducement
to net charitable giving. It is more accurate to think of the $4 billion
as a grant-in-aid program. Or, because a major justification for the
deduction has been thought to be a desirable transfer of decision
making power from the government to private decision makers (the
charities), 2 one could logically view the $4 billion as a revenue sharing
program.
9 For example, contributions to the American Birth Control League were held not
deductible because of "propaganda" activities of the League (see Slee v. Commissioner,
42 F.d 184 (2d Cir. 1930)), yet no one seriously questions the deductible status of contribu-
tions to the Roman Catholic Church on the basis of its recent lobbying efforts in New
York against the retention of legalized abortion.
A related problem is presented by a donation to an organization which, although
qualified at the time, abandons its charitable purpose. The donation then must be restored
to income unless redonated to another qualified organization. See Rev. Rul. 566, 1954-2
Cum. BuLL. 96. A deduction also will be denied if the donee has an organizational struc-
ture which is too informal. See Carolyn Trippe, 1950 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 50,176 (1951).
10 CODE § 170(b)(1)(A). The annual limit for individual contributions to preferred
organizations (churches, regular educational institutions, hospitals, domestic governments,
certain organizations related to these organizations, and public foundations) was increased
for the years after 1969 from 30%, to 50% of adjusted gross income.
11 See U.S. TREAs. DEr'T, supra note 1, at 40. A high percentage of very wealthy
donors, however, do utilize the full limit. See T. HuNTER, supra note 4, at 175-89. A survey
based on personal interviews with 30 of the 47 persons who had announced contributions
of at least $1 million in 1965 disclosed that over half (17 out of 80) had utilized the full
limit (then 50%) in each of the previous 10 years. Id. at 177. It is possible, however, that
this circumstance is due more to an uneven tax treatment of the difference between actual
income and adjusted gross income (principally by reason of the exemption for interest on
municipal bonds and the net long-term capital gains deduction) than to a propensity of
the wealthy to give a higher percentage of their discretionary income to charity. The same
survey reported that 18 of the 30 interviewees checked "tax considerations" as "very im-
portant" in deciding to make a gift. Id. at 179.
There also is a modest rise in the percentage of adjusted gross income donated by
those with adjusted gross income over $100,000. One author feels, however, that "it]he rise
at the top is due to an increase in the ratio of contributions to income, reflecting the im-
portance of philanthropy among the wealthy and the incentive for giftmaking provided by
the tax deduction." J. PECHmAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICy 81 (rev. ed. 1971). Studies have not
separated the incentive for making a full donation from that relating only to the amount
of the net donation (the out-of-pocket amount after the tax savings).
12 See, e.g., Rabin, Charitable Trusts and Charitable Deductions, 41 N.Y.U.L. Ray.
912, 921-22 (1966): "The deduction may be viewed primarily as a device for decentralizing
decisions concerning government expenditures."
Others prefer to focus upon the desirability of the activities of charitable organiza-
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What have these private decision makers promised to do with this
money or, if no meaningful promises have been made, what have
they in fact done with past donations? In order to remain entitled to
share in this revenue, an organization, as spelled out in the Internal
Revenue Code,13 must promise to operate solely for charitable purposes
in a broad sense 14 and to refrain from any activities inconsistent with
these charitable purposes.15 These promises have not been construed as
requiring the distribution or even the use of a single dollar of con-
tributions received, including the annual $4 billion of government
revenues, for charitable purposes.'6 All that is required is the distribu-
tion or use of any income obtained from investing the contributions re-
ceived.17
In practice, tax-exempt foundations have tended to comply only
with these minimal requirements.'8 Although some noteworthy ex-
ceptions could be listed, these organizations have shown that they
really do not currently need more money. Over the years they have
become so affluent that they can (or at least do) live on only the income
tions or upon the historic rationalization that the charitable deduction actually saves the
government money; the deduction "permits individuals to divert tax funds to certain kinds
of organizations. However, most people believe that the activities of these organizations
are generally socially desirable." J. PECHMAN, supra note 11, at 82. Still others view the
deduction as a revenue saving device. See D. SMrri, FaxarA TAX REFORM 101 (1961):
"[Private philanthropy] is a substitute for larger government expenditures in many areas,
as in hospitals, and thereby reduces the general tax burden." The validity of this justifi-
cation, however, turns on the existence of the deduction as an incentive for net giving,
which, as noted earlier, is highly questionable.
13 CODE § 501(c)(3). The types of organizations exempt are corporations, community
chests, funds, and foundations. There are, of course, many other organizations exempt
under Code § 501(c). The discussion herein is limited to § 501(c)(3) and the corresponding
portion of § 170(c), although much of the discussion would be equally applicable to other
exempt organizations. The basic question in considering these other organizations would
be whether they merely stand in the place of donors or are true charitable beneficiaries.
14 As used in this article, the term "charitable" includes all of the statutory purposes
stated in Code § 501(c)(3), i.e., "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals."
15 The requirement that the recipient be organized and operated "exclusively" for
the statutory purposes has been construed to mean that an organization's exempt status
can be revoked for substantial inconsistent conduct. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(I)
(1972).
16 See Rev. Rul. 149, 1967-1 GuM. BuLL. 133.
17 This requirement is somewhat vague except in the case of private nonoperating
foundations. Code § 4942 sets certain objective standards for income distributions required
of private nonoperating foundations. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
18 This is not necessarily true of tax-exempt organizations other than foundations,
although a substantial portion of contributions to educational institutions, for example,
generally are permanently invested. See Hearings pt. 5, at 1814 (statement of Dr. E. Wil-
kinson, President, Brigham Young University).
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from private and governmental donations.19 More to the point, they
have apparently decided that those presently in need of their charitable
programs and grants are only needy enough (as compared to the needs of
potential future beneficiaries) to require the income or the use of the
income.
A taxable donor who retained and invested a similar principal sum,
however, would receive no net tax benefit from annual gifts directly
to needy beneficiaries of the income from such principal-even if such
gifts were deductible-because the tax saved by the deductions would
be offset by the tax payable on the income.
Why should Congress be so enamored of the institutional donors
described in section 501(c)(3) that it is willing to pay $4 billion per
year to help sustain their work when they promise little more and do
nothing more than taxable donors who would receive no such benefits
if they acted in like fashion? What should Congress demand in return
for its $4 billion per year? And why should Congress not wait until that
demand is met before giving up these huge sums?
I
UNDERLYING TAx POLICY
A charitable gift, in a nontax sense, is usually thought of as a
transfer to or for the benefit of someone who is in need and who was
selected primarily because of that need. Some donors feel that they
are motivated by the charitable contributions deduction for donors and
the tax exemption for donees provided in the Internal Revenue Code.20
In carving out an exempt class of donees, however, Congress chose to
focus not upon need but upon the organizational status of the class. An
organization may achieve this status by promising that it will be or-
ganized and operated exclusively for charitable purposes, that is, for
the benefit of those determined to be in need by such donee organiza-
tion.21
19 A sample 534 foundations were studied for the period 1951-1960 by the House
Select Committee on Small Business, chaired by Representative Wright Patman. These
foundations received $4.7 billion as income from investments but expended only $4.2
billion for grants and administrative and operating expenses. More than $2.3 billion
received as new contributions during this same period was left untouched. HousE SELEcr
COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, TAx-ExEMPr FOUNDATIONS AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS: THEIR
IMPACT ON OUR ECONOMY, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 51 (Comm. Print 1962).
20 See note 11 supra.
21 The latest Internal Revenue Service listing of exempt organizations includes over
100,000 organizations which have made this promise and thus are qualified donees under
1973]
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Congress, the Treasury Department, and the courts have created
and refined a vast network of rules designed to hold these organizations
to their promises.22 The rules are in the form of prohibitions and
requirements rather than inducements. Although partially successful
in controlling tax-exempt organizations, the rules have created serious
problems. Because they are generally objective in form and extremely
complicated, they have in certain cases prohibited or unduly burdened
otherwise desirable conduct.23 The rules also undoubtedly have diluted
the effectiveness of the deduction and exemption as inducements to the
creation of charitable organizations, although it is hard to measure
the extent of this dilution.24
The Internal Revenue Service has neither the equipment nor
the incentive to police these organizations effectively.25 Indeed, this
policing function is foreign to the usual task of the Service which is to
examine whether voluntary conduct by taxpayers has been reported
correctly.
Even with adequate supervision the rules can perhaps never be suf-
ficiently tough to close all avenues of escape. For example, Congress has
shown only marginal concern for the organization which chooses to
sit on its money and do nothing for true charitable beneficiaries.
Churches, hospitals, universities, and public foundations can accumu-
late principal and income with impunity.26 The only possible means
§ 170(c). See U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, CiMuLATIVE LST OF ORGANIZATIONS DESCRIBED IN SECTION
170(c) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 (rev. ed. 1970).
22 Among the more important Code sections designed to regulate exempt organiza-
tions are § 503 (prohibited transactions), § 507 (termination of private foundation status),
§ 508 (special rules for § 501(c)(3) organizations), § 509 (definition of private foundation),
§8 511-14 (tax on unrelated business or debt financed income), §§ 4940-48 (excise taxes on
self-dealing, income accumulations, excess business holdings, and improper investments and
disbursements), § 1011(b) (basis in bargain sale to charity), and § 642(c) (deduction for
amounts in estate or trust permanently set aside for charity).
23 See pp. 329-30 infra.
24 See Hearings pt. 1, at 81-82 (statement of M. Pattillo, Jr., President Emeritus, The
Foundation Center). Dr. Pattillo urged simplification: "Almost no layman fully under-
stands the present tax laws. I cringe at the thought that the laws may become even more
intricate and abstruse." Id.
But Dr. Pattillo's plea was to no avail. Indeed, we are beginning to see the demise of
some small charities as a direct result of the 1969 Tax Reform Act. See, e.g., Estate of
Harry L. Stem, 29 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 72-503 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. Jan. 17, 1972) (charitable
trust terminated because 1969 Tax Reform Act too burdensome).
25 See pp. 337-38 infra.
26 Prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act, private foundations were prohibited from un-
reasonably accumulating income. See CODE § 504, repealed, Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub.
L No. 91-172, ch. 1, § 1010)(15), 83 Stat. 527. No mention was made of principal. Section
4942 replaced this general prohibition with a requirement of current income distributions
under a more objective formula; unfortunately, it applies to an even smaller group-pri-
vate nonoperating foundations. Still no mention is made of principal.
[Vol. 58:304
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of challenging the inactivity of these organizations is to argue that
they have completely failed to live up to their promises and thus are
not section 501(c)(3) organizations at all. The resulting sanction, com-
plete taxation, is extremely difficult to enforce, primarily because of its
severity.27
In practice this has meant that billions of dollars worth of con-
tributions have never been put to charitable use or distributed to true
charitable beneficiaries, and that billions more have only slowly
trickled through section 501(c)(3) organizations to such beneficiaries. 28
The unused sums are presumably being held to aid future beneficiaries.
No current law is violated by this practice. Nor does the practice
seem to be morally troublesome to professional foundation managers.29
Perhaps Congress ought benignly to defer to their judgment. Such
inaction seems inappropriate, however, given the fact that billions of
tax dollars have been poured into the pockets of charitable donors via
the deduction and exemption without obtaining reasonably current
benefits in return.
These matters are more fully explored in the following discussion,
and two major changes in tax policy are suggested. First, the two tax
benefits now available to a section 501(c)(3) organization-the receipt
of a one-for-two government share and the exemption for investment
income-should be made available only if and to the extent that the
organization acts to pass through charitable benefits. Thus, if the
organization delays the pass through, the related tax benefits also
should be delayed. Second, these organizations, as well as all other
taxpayers, should be induced, rather than required, to provide chari-
table benefits. Present attempts to enforce charitable promises should
be abandoned; organizations should be free to delay or totally decline
any tax benefits and to manage their properties as they see fit. The
practical result of these changes would be to eliminate the need for
classifying such charitable organizations separately for tax purposes.
They would become fully taxable.
II
A PRoPosAL FOR REFoRm
The following proposal would replace the present tax exemption
with a charitable contributions credit available if and when property
27 See pp. 329-30 infra.
28 See p. 321 infra.
29 See pp. 328-28 infra.
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is expended for charitable work. 0 Logically, a charitable contributions
credit should not be provided for grants to intermediaries, 1 but only
for direct expenditures, through grants or programs, to benefit true
objects of charity. Because of the lack of an incentive effect on after-
tax giving, if individual donors continued to give to intermediaries,
the annual $13 billion could be expected to drop to about $9 billion
of nondeductible contributions. Then, when expenditures were made
by the intermediaries of this amount, the government could issue
grants totaling $4 billion.
Because taxpayers have become psychologically accustomed to
receiving a tax incentive for charitable contributions,3 2 however, the
proposal permits a charitable contributions credit for gifts to inter-
mediaries matched by a tax of like amount for the same year that the
intermediaries receive the gifts. This modification would eliminate
an apparent bias against organized charitable intermediaries by per-
mitting the government's share to pass through the donor's hands to
the intermediary just as if the intermediary were itself a needy bene-
ficiary to whom the donor had made a direct gift.33
30 The use of a credit rather than a deduction is not new. In England a tax rebate
to the exempt organization at a flat rate is available for donations made pursuant to a
promise to give fixed sums for more than six years. This, in reality, is a credit, although
payable directly to the exempt organization. See T. HUNTER, supra note 4, at 67; Stone,
supra note 2, at 30-31 n.11. Professor Stone notes that there might be a problem with a
credit in the minds of some who feel that "the poor do not support the 'right causes,'
such as higher education." Id. at 47 (footnote omitted). He indicates that a variable credit
to remedy this feeling may not be politically feasible and that a deduction with a floor
would be preferable. Id.
Others claim that the variable nature of the deduction which favors the rich is
one of its chief problems. See, e.g., White, Proper Income Tax Treatment of Deductions
for Personal Expense, in 1 HOUsE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAx REVISION CourFlNDIUM:
COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAx BASE 371 (Comm. Print 1959). Still others
feel that a direct grant would be even better than a credit. See generally Hearings
pt. 1, at 5-6 (remarks of Representative W. Mills).
A credit, rather than a deduction, is suggested in the proposal for reasons of simplicity
as well as the above considerations of equity. A deduction would require complicated
rules to prevent income shifting from high to low brackets and, conversely, to prevent
income bunching in large unincorporated foundations. What is new in the proposal, how-
ever, is the delaying of a tax benefit until the charitable organization expends a corre-
sponding amount for charitable work.
31 By "intermediaries" is meant those organizations (or parts of organizations) which
receive donations but do not themselves conduct charitable programs.
32 Even the sophisticated donor may think of the deduction as an inducement, and
may be likely to differentiate, in this respect, between his gross gift and his gift net of
taxes saved. Cf. T. HUNTER, supra note 4, at 43-46.
33 Under the proposal, the present denial of tax benefits for individual charitable
gifts directly to needy individuals would be removed.
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The following specific changes would be incorporated into the
Code to implement the proposed charitable contributions credit:
(1) Section 501(c)(3)34 would be repealed.
(2) Section 170r, would be reconstituted to permit a credit rather
than a deduction, with the following additional changes:
(a) A "charitable contribution" would be defined as a gift
or contribution of property-
(i) to true charitable beneficiaries;3 6 or
(ii) in payment of the ordinary and necessary expenses
or costs of assets directly related to a specific, cur-
rently operating charitable program;37 or
(iii) to any person under circumstances reasonably in-
dicating to the recipient that the property is in-
tended for future disbursement as a charitable
contribution. 38
(b) Any taxpayer could take a charitable contributions credit
equal to thirty percent of his charitable contributions for
the year.
(c) Maximum annual charitable contributions credit:
(i) The present annual limits of twenty percent and fifty
percent of adjusted gross income (for individuals)
and five percent of taxable income (extended to
cover all nonindividuals)89 would be used to limit
the amount of creditable contributions per year.
(ii) Contributions in excess of the limits in (i) would
be creditable to the extent of current and accumu-
lated contributions received under (a)(iii).
(3) A recipient of a charitable contribution described in (2)(a)(iii)
34 See generally notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
35 See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
36 "True charitable benefidaries" would be defined as persons unrelated to the donor,
selected solely on the basis of need or such other factors as are normally used (as indicated
by the nature of the gift).
87 "Charitable program" is used in the broad sense to cover all of the Code § 170(c)(2)
purposes. These purposes are identical to the Code § 501(c)(3) purposes with the exclusion
of testing for public safety. The focus, under the proposal, would be upon programs and
not purposes-upon action rather than promises.
38 This might entail some simple record keeping by donors, perhaps by obtaining
receipts which would indicate that the donee knew or should have known that the gift
was charitable.
89 Estates and trusts would use the 5% limit. Thus, unincorporated foundations
would be placed on a par with incorporated ones in this respect.
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would be liable for a flat rate tax in the year of receipt equal
to thirty percent of the amount of the contribution. 40
A. New Tax Policy
This proposal would render foundations, churches, universities,
hospitals, and all other section 501(c)(3) organizations fully taxable.
In addition to taxing receipts of charitable contributions at thirty
percent, the proposal would render dividends, interest income, capital
gains, and other income of charitable organizations taxable in the
same manner as those of other taxpayers. The charitable contributions
credit would replace these lost benefits, permitting most charitable
organizations to eliminate their tax liability through action rather
than promises. The credit, moreover, would not just extend to these
organizations but to all taxpayers. The same provisions would govern
the initial donation and subsequent charitable uses or re-donations
of the same property or its income. Intermediary organizations thus
would be treated as donors rather than as section 501(c)(3) donees.
The charitable contributions credit would automatically render
charitable contributions "current" in the sense that government reve-
nues would not be depleted unless and until property were actually
disbursed to needy persons or spent to pay for expenses or to purchase
assets currently needed for charitable programs. No requirements for
applying property in these ways would be retained in the Code. Thus,
the government's share would serve only as an inducement. A tax-
payer would know that for every nine dollars ultimately spent for
charity, the government would spend four dollars.41 In other words,
the government would let the taxpayer spend the four dollars for
charity. An identical inducement would exist for the spending of in-
come from charitable contributions received.
Because of the annual percentage limitations, however, it would
not be possible for a taxpayer to eliminate completely his tax liability
each year merely by disbursing all of his income as charitable contribu-
tions unless he had a very small amount of adjusted gross income or a
very great quantity of itemized deductions. Thus, for most taxpayers,
tax free status could be preserved only for a limited time by making
annual distributions of principal from charitable contributions re-
40 A 30% rate would produce revenue approximately equal to the revenue now lost,
assuming that total charitable giving was not affected by the change.
41 In order to permit the taxpayer to spend the $4 even though he only has in his
possession the after-tax amount of $9, the Code could allow the taxpayer to credit $13 for
every $9 charitable contribution with the $4 refund paid directly to the donee designated
by the taxpayer.
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ceived.4 Regardless of his economic status, however, a taxpayer could
call upon the government to lend the same thirty percent support to
his charitable choices. This alone would be a considerable improve-
ment over the present system which permits taxpayers in the top in-
dividual tax brackets to contribute up to seventy percent of their
donations to their favorite charities on behalf of the government while
less wealthy donors may have to foot most of the bill themselves.4 3
On the other hand, if the proposal were to utilize a deduction
rather than a credit, charitable receipts also would have to be taxed
at the regular rates. This would penalize unfairly many larger foun-
dations which presently operate as trusts. Moreover, to the extent that
contributions to intermediaries are collected and concentrated, the
overall amount of tax payable by them upon receipt might be greater
than the corresponding overall tax saved by their donors. For these
reasons, a flat rate credit seems preferable.
By substituting an incentive for the present multitude of require-
ments with which Congress now burdens exempt organizations (and
especially private foundations), it would be permissible, as far as the
Treasury were concerned, for such organizations to fail to live up to
their selfless advertising. No tax revenues would be lost if this hap-
42 For example, if an incorporated organization received a charitable gift of $1 ml-
lion, it would pay a 30% flat rate tax in the year of receipt. If the remaining $700,000 were
invested at 6% to earn $42,000 with annual expenses of $2,000, and the remaining $40,000
were distributed as charitable contributions, an additional $42,667 charitable contribution
would be necessary to eliminate completely the tax otherwise payable. The credit would
almost offset the regular tax:
Gross Income $42,000
Expenses 2,000
Taxable Income 40,000
Gross Tax Payable 13,700
Less 30% Credit:
Current Income Limit (600)
Accumulated Donations Received (13,100)
-0-
Only $2,000 (5% of $40,000) could be treated as a contribution out of current income.
This would produce a $600 credit (30% of $2,000). The remaining $13,100 would be 30%
of an additional contribution of $42,667, and the remaining $30,400 would be applied to
reduce accumulated contributions received. Thus, in about 25 years accumulated contribu-
tions would be used up and the organization, if no further contributions were received,
would cease to exist. Its extinction, however, would be purely voluntary.
43 Charities selected by those who do not itemize their deductions, of course, receive
no extra aid from the government. The new credit (CODE § 41) for 50% of political con-
tributions of individuals up to $25 appears to be an attempt to recognize the inequity of
deducting (rather than crediting) expenses such as this which are not related to personal
or business expenses.
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pened, and the burden of policing these organizations would be shifted
to the donors whose individual contributions were not being used as
intended. Perhaps state governments, which already share the policing
burden, would take their responsibilities more seriously.4
B. Additional Benefits
Present law forces a donor to use an approved intermediary in
order to obtain the benefit of a deduction. A small donor has no choice
but to use already established foundations, funds, or other organiza-
tions and then to sit back and hope that his money will be put to good
use. Many such organizations are controlled by large donors or by
boards comprised of the wealthy or the influential.45 In order to re-
ceive a deduction, a small donor generally must turn his donation
over to these people. By contrast, if a wealthy donor does not already
control an existing foundation, it probably is feasible for him to estab-
lish one.
The proposal eliminates the need for approved intermediaries. A
charitable contributions credit would be available for contributions
directly to needy or worthy beneficiaries as well as to intermediaries.
Even a small donor could establish a charitable program if he desired
to do so. Expenses of such programs would be creditable, within limits,
just as expenses of small businesses are deductible.
If an intermediary were used, it would not have to cut itself off
from all noncharitable endeavors to remain in the government's good
graces. A university could, for example, own and operate a macaroni
factory. No harm would be done because both the university and the
factory would be taxable, whether operated separately or as one entity.
An important change in the proposed definition of charitable con-
tributions is the exclusion of endowments. No credit would be per-
mitted for property placed in an endowment fund. A contribution to
an endowment fund set up for charitable purposes would be creditable,
but the fund, upon receipt of the property, would pay the thirty per-
cent tax. Thereafter, the mere fact that the property was part of an
endowment set up to finance specific charitable programs would not
44 As one federal official stated, "The states should have responsibility for this kind
of regulation. But they have done virtually nothing. Each of these organizations is a
creature of a state." Quoted in T. HUNTER, supra note 4, at 168.
45 See Harris, Tax-Exempt Organizations, in 3 HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM: COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS ON BROADENING THE TAX BASE 2102
(Comm. Print 1959) (referring specifically to research institutes). The 1969 Tax Reform
Act, which increased greatly the risk and expense of operating small private foundations,
undoubtedly has served to increase this phenomenon.
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permit the fund to take a charitable contributions credit. The chari-
table contributions credit would become available as income or prin-
cipal of the fund was expended for program related assets or ordinary
and necessary expenses. If at the end of the program remaining funds
were distributed as a charitable contribution, a credit would be avail-
able.
Expenses for such programs could not be deducted alternatively as
business expenses unless the requisite profit motive were present. The
proposal thus would present no opportunity for tax manipulation other
than that inherent in deciding whether any expenditure is or is not a
business expense. The already familiar "ordinary and necessary" tests,
which are used to circumscribe business expense deductions,46 could
be used to test the creditability of expenses related to charitable pro-
grams.
C. Overall Effect
The overall economic effect of the proposal, if an intermediary
eventually does distribute all of the property received as charitable
contributions, would merely be to deprive the intermediary of the
present privilege of investing and earning a return on the tax dollars
representing the government's share of the contribution. The proposal
thus limits the government's share to thirty percent and no more.
Under present law, the fact that the intermediary can receive and re-
tain the whole contribution, including the government's share, creates
an incentive to delay disbursements. The longer the delay, the greater
the opportunity to invest and thus increase the government's share of
the eventual distribution. This creates an unfair advantage over those
organizations that may need to disburse funds earlier.
From the government's side, not only will the proposal limit the
government's share to an even percentage but, to the extent that the
present deduction causes a drain on revenues going to the benefit of
intermediaries who never distribute the revenues as charitable con-
tributions, the proposal will result in a permanent savings.47
46 See CODE § 162.
47 As a side effect, the proposal would introduce more flexibility. Perhaps a wealthy
donor did not really intend his family foundation (to which he is the sole donor) to be a
charitable foundation. Or perhaps he later experiences a change in fortune and begins to
wish that he had been less generous with past promises. Because the government has not
yet disbursed any revenue to his foundation, there would be no reason for trying to lock
in the donor's past contributions and then force them on through to true charitable
benefidaries.
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III
CURRENT PASS THROUGH OF BENEFITS
A. Historical Perspective
Although men may differ as to whether one beneficiary of charity
is worthier than another, few have ever questioned the desirability
of charitable giving. It is generally agreed that charitable organizations
do good works and make good works by others possible. For centuries
such institutions have been considered worthy of governmental sup-
port in the form of tax relief.48
In the United States, the first corporate income tax in 1894 con-
tained an exemption for corporations and associations "organized and
conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes."4 9
No recorded legislative history states the reasons for this exemption.
The Congressional Record reflects only some haggling over whether
various other organizations should be similarly blessed6 0 One can only
guess that the exemption was viewed as a proper helping hand to or-
ganized charity.51
It was not until 1917, when Congress raised the individual income
tax rates to relatively high levels to help finance the First World War,
that an amendment to provide for a charitable contributions deduction
was introduced. 2 Then, as now, no one appeared to question whether
the deduction cast doubt upon the continuing validity of what has
come to be a related tax exemption."
If a given organization were to promise to devote all of its own
properties toward providing charitable benefits, it would not matter,
from the standpoint of tax cost, whether principal were ever distrib-
uted. The tax cost would be spread out over the years since income
would be earned tax free. Of course, in 1894 there could have been
some legitimate interest in ensuring that tax free income was put to
charitable use, but in those days it would have been difficult for an
48 Tax exemptions for charitable organizations have been traced back to the sixth
century B.C. T. HuNmT-, supra note 4, at 4.
49 Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 348, § 82, 28 Stat. 556.
50 See 26 CONG. REC. 6622-23, 6870, 6883-87 (1894) (remarks of Senators Hill, Perkins,
and Teller).
51 The corporate tax rate in those days was only 2%, as was the federal individual
income tax. Possibly some considered the status as reflecting a "hands off" policy similar to
the First Amendment's separation of Church and State, or perhaps it was sufficient to
recall that such exemptions dated from antiquity.
52 55 CONG. RmC. 6728 (1917) (remarks of Senator Hollis).
53 Id. See also note 4 sutpra.
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organization to qualify as a tax-exempt organization at all if it did not
have some kind of ongoing program that would automatically require
at least some distribution or other charitable use of income.5 4
With the singling out of these same organizations as qualified
recipients of deductible gifts from others, the purely passive inter-
mediary became a reality. The organization was no longer dealing with
its own property but with a gift from someone else for which a deduc-
tion had already been taken. Only if it is assumed that Congress en-
visioned a recipient badly in need of funds for its ongoing charitable
programs can Congress be forgiven its failure to realize that an exempt
organization's duty might be different when dealing with someone
else's deducted contribution than when dealing with its own property.
The Congressional Record reflects this concern. Senator Hollis, in
urging the adoption of the deduction in 1917, emphasized that it was
intended to counter the possibility that the new high wartime tax rates
might cause a decline in charitable giving to educational institutions.
Moreover, he argued that the deduction would save federal revenue
because these charitable projects, if not funded privately, would have
to be taken over in full by the government. To the extent that the
deduction induced private funding, the government would be relieved
of this expense.5 5 Both of these arguments imply a reasonably current
pass through of donations. Congress seemed to be focusing more upon
encouraging the benefits that exempt organizations would confer upon
needy persons than upon subsidizing the cost to the donor in making
a charitable gift or upon making life easier for exempt organizations
themselves.
B. The Exempt Organization as an Intermediary
Assume that an individual donor wants to make a contribution
directly to some needy person or worthy cause. It makes little sense to
say that he cannot deduct his contribution for such direct charity
merely because the donee does not happen to be a favored exempt
organization. If he can afford the time and expense he can set up a
controlled charitable foundation as an intermediary and then take his
deduction for a contribution to the intermediary. His tax-exempt foun-
dation will then distribute his contribution, at his direction, to a needy
person or worthy cause.
54 Before the passage of the charitable deduction, there would have been fewer
reasons for a transfer, for example, to a trust, which would result in a holding operation.
Estate planning considerations would provide limited exceptions.
55 See 55 CONG. Rc. 6728 (1917) (remarks of Senator Holis).
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The intermediary foundation itself need not undertake any chari-
table, religious, or educational activity to qualify for a tax exemption.
Although probably aware of this circumstance in 1917, Congress un-
doubtedly did not consider the inactive intermediary to be the
primary recipient of deductible donations.56 Since 1940, however,
there has been a tremendous increase in the number of tax-exempt
organizations which do not themselves conduct charitable activities.
A survey by the Treasury Department, using data for 1962, reported
over 15,000 such foundations.57 In a similar tabulation, the Russell
Sage Foundation reported that, excluding some very small foundations,
only twenty-six foundations which still exist predated the twentieth
century, and only 591 were founded before 1940. In all, over 17,000
existed in 1966.58
No one knows exactly how many tax-exempt foundations are now
in existence; however, the number is enormous and growing. There
are numerous variations in the types of these foundations, but they
share one common attribute: they are inactive intermediaries and, as
such, they do not directly engage in charitable activities but rather re-
ceive, accumulate, manage, invest, and, hopefully, distribute charitable
gifts to true charitable beneficiaries.59
It has long been recognized that there are some "bad apples" in
the foundation barrel. Congress in 1950 and again in 1969 made ex-
tensive attempts to sort these out.60 But what Congress apparently has
failed to appreciate is that these intermediaries are not true charitable
beneficiaries at all and should not be classified as such. These inter-
mediaries really stand in the shoes of their donors. If any special tax
treatment is necessary, logic impels that they be treated as donors, not
as beneficiaries. As such, the only reason for rendering them tax-
exempt is to avoid cancelling out the benefits of the charitable deduc-
tion to the original donors as donations pass through the intermediaries
56 Id.
57 U.S. TREAs. DEP'T, REPORT ON PRIvATE FOUNDATIONS 77 (1965).
58 RUSsELL SAGE FOUNDATION, THE FOUNDATION DmucroRy 11 (3d ed. 1967). The study
notes that of the "over $1 million" foundations (measured by the fair market value of
current holdings), 47% were founded before 1940. Id. This figure must be augmented
by those foundations (not included in the tabulation) which were organized for a special
purpose, feeder organizations of other specific organizations, and publicly supported
foundations.
59 This conduct is not unique to foundations. Churches, universities, hospitals,
research centers, art museums, symphony orchestras, and the like also may serve in part
as inactive intermediaries.
60 See note 22 supra.
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to true charitable beneficiaries, assuming that the donations do in fact
pass through.
C. The Pass Through Problem
The 1965 Treasury Department survey revealed that the over
15,000 foundations tabulated reported assets with a fair market value
of about $15.5 billion. For the year, over $0.8 billion was received in
new donations. The telling point is that these foundations' income
(after expenses and including capital gains) was $1.1 billion, and their
grants for the year totalled $1.0 billion.61 Thus, no net disbursement
of principal was made. Only current income from donations or from
existing principal was passed through. Further, it is impossible to tell
how much of this pass through actually was spent to benefit true chari-
table beneficiaries and how much simply went to other intermediaries.
This lack of disbursement of principal is not violative of our
present tax laws. In 1950 Congress added to the Code section 504 which
prohibited unreasonable accumulations of income. This section was
replaced in 1970 by an excise tax (which rapidly becomes confiscatory)
for failure to distribute income currently. 2 A minimum distribution
requirement equal to six percent of asset fair market value is intended
to ensure that the new excise tax will not be frustrated by investing in
low income properties. The harshness of this new provision is miti-
gated by the continuation of the exclusion of long-term capital gains
and tax-exempt interest from distributable income and by permitting
the deduction of all ordinary and necessary expenses. The new rule,
moreover, only applies to a limited type of intermediary-the private
nonoperating foundation. Publicly supported intermediaries and in-
termediaries that also engage in substantial charitable activities are not
covered. The Treasury Department figures indicate that even for those
foundations covered the new excise tax will not change what founda-
tions in general already do or, more accurately, do not do. It will affect
only those stray foundations that are substantially below the average.
But why should the line be drawn at a distribution of income?
Why not also require a distribution of principal? After all, by deduct-
ing a donation of principal and then sheltering the income in a foun-
dation, the donor in effect is afforded a charitable deduction for both
principal and all future income. For example, if a donor makes a $100
contribution to a foundation, he not only may deduct the $100, but he
61 See REPORT ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at 79-80.
62 CODE § 4942,
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also avoids reporting the income that the $100 may earn while being
invested by the foundation. This is equivalent to reporting the income
earned by the foundation and then offsetting it with another charitable
deduction.
If the same donor had not made a $100 contribution but instead
had invested the money at six percent, he would have had to report $6
of income annually. If the $6 had then been donated to the foundation
each year, a $6 charitable deduction could then offset his $6 of income.
If the foundation were to pass through the $6, the annual benefit to
true charitable beneficiaries would be the same as under the first
alternative.
The only difference between these two alternatives is that by
making a donation of principal the donor has irrevocably committed
himself to donate the income each year to the foundation. Is this
promise really important enough to justify a present deduction? Math-
ematically, the answer is yes. By making an irrevocable commitment,
the donor has given away the present value of the sum of all future
income and, at the end, any remaining portion of the principal. These
together are equal to the present value of the principal. In the process,
of course, he cannot retain the value of the property himself. But a
charitable deduction is not primarily intended as compensation for
what the donor gives up. His loss must be matched by a true charitable
beneficiary's gain.
A similar argument of equality cannot be made regarding the
benefits reaching true charitable beneficiaries. Just because the loss to
the donor is the same whether he makes a present gift of principal or a
present irrevocable commitment to give all future income, the inter-
mediary cannot claim that the gain is the same to true charitable bene-
ficiaries whether it makes a present distribution of principal or a
present commitment to distribute the income as it comes in. To the
donor, the income he may receive by investing his principal is a pay-
ment for giving up for a time the use of the principal and for the risk
of collecting his income and, eventually, receiving back his principal.
These factors bear little relationship to the real needs, both present
and future, of charitable beneficiaries.
By making a contribution to an intermediary, the donor cannot
say that it makes no difference whether the money is spent to satisfy
present or future charitable needs just because it makes no difference
to him whether he makes his contribution now or ties up property to
ensure his making it later. In effect, the donor is saying to the founda-
tion "Give me your advice. If you think that present needs are more
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pressing, spend it now. If not, you can wait until later." The same
amount of money (as measured by present value) will be available
either way, but that does not mean that it will do the same amount of
good whenever it is spent.
By leaving this choice up to the intermediary, Congress has also
empowered it to make the same decision as to the taxpayers' share, the
share equal to the taxes not collected. Should Congress trust inter-
mediaries to make this choice? Should it not at least consider the
matter? After all, a donor, at least of a sizable donation, can instruct
the intermediary in this regard. In many cases, a large donor actually
controls the intermediary. The government, as already mentioned, has
become a large donor too. In 1970, of the over $4 billion related to
individual donations alone, it is a reasonable estimate that almost $1
billion went to intermediaries. 63
D. Arguments for Accumulating Principal
Many foundation managers and legislators argue that in order
to provide a balance to the control which the federal government exer-
cises over its vast revenues, nongovernmental decision makers should be
allowed to decide when to spend for projects and also to decide which
projects should be undertaken. This argument of managerial plural-
ism64 is persuasive with regard to the nontax portion of charitable con-
tributions. It would be persuasive as to the tax portion as well if that
portion came only out of the pockets of the same charitable donors.
The donors then would be choosing foundation managers over govern-
mental managers.
To the extent that the government has to replace these lost tax
dollars with funds from other sources, however, the choice becomes
involuntary. This is especially true if the "other sources" are increased
taxes collected from nondonors. Still, there is some persuasive force to
the argument that our government has made a reasonable decision to
let foundations share in the decision making process.
There is, however, little to commend the advance funding of
foundations by the government upon the understanding that the foun-
63 In 1962, about $1 billion out of a total of $4 billion in charitable contributions
deducted went to foundations. See US. TREAS. DEP'T, STATISTICS OF INcoME: 1962 INDVDUAL
INCOmE TAX RaruRNs 6-8 (1965). By 1970 the contributions deducted had risen more than
threefold. See note 1 and accompanying text supra. If contributions to foundations also
increased by the same multiple to over $3 billion, 30% of that figure would yield about
$1 billion as the government's share.
64 See, e.g., R. GoODE, THE INDvDuAL INCOME TAX 170-71 (1964); Fremont-Smith,
Duties and Powers of Charitable Fiduciaries: The Law of Trusts and the Correction of
Abuses, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1041 (1966).
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dations may decide when to spend the money. This practice results in
a hidden subsidy, i.e., the extra income that foundations can receive by
investing these tax dollars.65 This amounts to an endowment of a
promise-a very expensive way to achieve managerial pluralism.
Foundation managers also make the following arguments:66
1. Benefits from Size
A large foundation arguably can undertake many important
though expensive projects which smaller foundations and individual
philanthropists cannot. In most cases the price for this power and
flexibility is the considerable delay which must be suffered while the
foundation builds up to gigantic proportions through the accumulation
of principal.
A smaller foundation, however, could also undertake large projects
much sooner if it made its principal available rather than waiting until
its income alone was large enough to handle the expense. The founda-
tion might not continue in perpetuity, of course, if it spent principal.
2. Expert Management
Foundation managers point out that their "business" is charity
and that they can put a wealthy donor's funds to much more produc-
tive use because of this expertise. Assuming that this is so, the fact re-
mains that the funds must indeed be put to some charitable use to
take advantage of these skills. If these skills are exercised only by way
of prudent investment of principal and reinvestment of income, foun-
dation managers are performing a service no different from that offered
by most brokerage houses and large banks. Congress has not seen fit
to place the latter institutions in the tax-exempt category, and founda-
tions should fare no better.
3. Difficulty in Spending Large Sums
The argument that large sums are difficult to spend is persuasive
only in the short run. Even a very large bequest could generally be
put to good use over an extended period of time. Moreover, it is not
necessary for the foundation to hold the taxpayers' share during the
time necessary to make these decisions.
65 See note 2 supra. If the estimated annual subsidy of $4 billion is invested at 6%,
$240 million in additional subsidy is being paid each year. This $240 million is also tax-
exempt, which makes the annual revenue loss even higher.
66 See I S. WEITHORN, TAX TECHNIQUES FOR FOUNDATIONS AND OTM EXEMPT ORGAN-
ZANONS § 11.02 (1964). See generally Hearings pt. 1, at 245-93, 354-431 (statements of J.G.
Harrar, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, and McG. Bundy, President of the Ford
Foundation).
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4. Insurance Against Hard Times
Another short run argument is that foundations should be per-
mitted to collect in good times and reserve some of that accumulated
principal for expenditure in times of decreased giving. Foundations
need not act as repositories for tax funds, however. Income from invest-
ing tax funds would make the accumulation of this reserve easier, but
it is difficult to accord this need a high priority.
5. Backing for Ongoing Projects
A persuasive argument can be made for the proposition that a
tax-exempt organization should be permitted to retain enough prin-
cipal so that the income from that principal will be sufficient to cover
the costs of some long-range fixed charitable commitment. For example,
an organization might wish to endow a specific long-range medical re-
search project, a hospital, a chaired professorship, a public gardens, or
a Colonial Williamsburg. Some of these projects could not be under-
taken if the organization had to rely on current donations or even on a
short-term amortization of a principal sum for their maintenance. The
nature of this type of undertaking requires economic security. Another
reason for requiring an endowment would be to ensure a measure of
independence from those persons who might wish to use proffered
charitable donations to control the institution. 7
The policy changes advocated herein would prefer current good
works over the provision of either economic security or independence
to long-range projects. The preference would operate most severely
against programs of indefinite or unlimited duration. Not only would
the income from the tax dollars be lost but, as a practical matter, the
tax dollars would be lost as well. Only by overspending current income
could these tax dollars be recovered, and this presumably would occur,
if at all, only at the end of such a program.68
67 Controversal programs at educational institutions may exemplify this reason. One
well-known example was the funding by the Ford Foundation of the Ocean Hill-Browns-
ville project in 1968. This experiment in school decentralization caused serious disruption
in the New York City schools involved. For this reason, the funding has come under sharp
attack. See Hearings pt. 1, at 15 (statement of Representative W. Patman).
68 A good deal of economic security and independence could be achieved, however,
by using the after-tax balance as an endowment. It is not clear why complete security and
independence are desirable for any charitable project, especially if the project is being
provided involuntarily by the general taxpaying public. The proposed changes would
operate to require organizations to set some (perhaps long-term) life span on such projects
or to engage in extra fund raising so that the entire program could be endowed with after-
tax dollars.
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6. Present Tax Laws Encourage Donations
If Congress were to take away the privilege of tax free accumu-
lation of donations, some donors would decrease their giving because
of the loss-perhaps permanent--of the funds now available from the
government. This would be true for those donors who never really
intend for their gifts to be put to charitable use. For example, a donor
might place a controlling block of stock in a family foundation in an
attempt to perpetuate his control and to avoid having the stock scat-
tered among his heirs or sold for taxes after his death. Clearly, Congress
never intended to subsidize this effort with a tax deduction. Similarly,
the "empire builder" who values the slow growth of a large foundation
at the expense of present charitable work would be discouraged.
Many charitable donations have been made with the stipulation
that the principal never be spent. This circumstance points out the
most severe application of the proposed changes. Whether the funds
were committed as specific backing or used as a general endowment,
the tax dollars would be lost. In effect, no tax incentive would remain
for such gifts. Although these gifts obviously are valuable to donees,
they would no longer be subsidized. 9
It is likely that many gifts in the same amounts would be made
despite the absence of the deduction. The true donor should be en-
couraged in his giving by the knowledge that his principal will be put
to early charitable use in order to obtain maximum tax benefits.7 0 This
conclusion appears even stronger with regard to lasting gifts such as
endowments. The proposal, of course, advocates replacement not blan-
ket repeal, and tends to focus the tax incentives where they are needed
the most-on gifts to be distributed or used for the expenses of chari-
table projects.
E. Argument for Current Distribution of Principal
It has for so long been assumed that proper foundation manage-
ment calls for a preservation of principal that it is difficult to find
69 Subject to the annual percentage limitations, charitable spending of the income
still would entitle the charity to a credit. In addition, it might be that state courts would
be responsive to a request by foundation managers that such principal restrictions imposed
in the past by donors now deceased be removed. Similar requests have been granted
recently so that private foundations can comply with the 1969 Tax Reform Act require-
ments. See In re Estate of Barkey, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-804 (N.Y. Sur. CL 1971)
(trustee ordered to act within 1969 Tax Reform Act rules, pursuant to doctrine of
cy pres); Edward W. Bok Trust, 27 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 71-1331 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (trust
instrument amended to conform to 1969 Tax Reform Act rules, pursuant to general spirit
of grantor's intent).
70 See note 7 supra.
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people who will even question the propriety of the assumption.7 1 This
in itself is an argument for not leaving the decision solely in the hands
of foundations. Foundation management should be required at least
to consider the current distribution of principal.
In earlier times when such philosophical matters were discussed,
a few heretics openly advocated this practice. For example, the late
Julius Rosenwald, creator of the Julius Rosenwald Fund, is reported
to have said:
I am not in sympathy with this policy of perpetuating endow-
ments and believe that more good can be accomplished by expend-
ing funds as Trustees find opportunities for constructive work than
by storing up large sums of money for long periods of time....
Coming generations can be relied upon to provide for their own
needs as they arise72
Frederick T. Gates, a close adviser to John D. Rockefeller, Sr., is
claimed to have told him:
Your fortune is rolling up, rolling up like an avalanchel You
must keep up with it You must distribute it faster than it grows!
If you do not, it will crush you and your children and your chil-
dren's children.73
The elder Rockefeller apparently heeded this advice; the Rockefeller
Foundation was not set up as a perpetuity (although, of course, it has
been operated as such).
The fact that, on the average, no net distribution of principal is
today being made by foundations should raise some eyebrows. Is it
possible that current income from past donations is sufficient to take
care of so many of our pressing charitable needs that those which re-
main are all outweighed by future charitable needs? In the public
sector this is not thought to be the case. Imagine what would happen
to the re-election chances of a politician who openly advocated taxing
now to build up a reserve to be used to finance programs of future
generations. Yet this is just what Congress is allowing to happen, albeit
covertly, through the charitable deduction.
Even assuming that foundation managers are exercising their
71 Even Representative Patman, after noting that "when a privilege is abused, it
should be withdrawn," went on to explain that donations received would be excluded from
the 20% tax that he would impose upon gross income of private foundations. Hearings
pt. 1, at 12. As to required distributions, Representative Patman advocated only a require-
ment that they "spend, annually, their net income." Id. at 20.
72 Quoted in HousE Sa.Cr COMM. ON SMALL BusINEss, supra note 19, at 138.
73 Quoted in HousE SmCT CoM. ON SMALL BusINESS, TAx-EXEMPT FouNDATioNs AND
CmuuTABLE TRUSTS: THF= IMPACT ON =ru ECONOUY, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (Comm. Print
1966).
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expertise, one might ask whether they labor under a conflict of in-
terests. The foundation manager has a vested interest in the preserva-
tion of his own position or at least in the preservation of his foundation.
If principal is spent, the foundation may run out of funds and cease to
exist. But the taxpayer is entitled to have his interest represented in
an unbiased manner. He is entitled to a decision made without preju-
dice as to whether the immortality of the foundation itself is impaired.7 4
The propriety of saving to meet future needs is highly question-
able. If only current donations were spent along with income from
past donations, the annual amount expended would be almost doubled.
In other words, even after all accumulated principal were spent, a pass
through of present donations would permit foundations and other in-
termediaries to maintain approximately their current level of distri-
butions. It is as if we had set aside many billions as insurance against
some unforeseen catastrophe. This display of affluence is hardly consis-
tent with the picture painted by Senator Hollis of the struggle of our
great educational institutions to avoid being run aground by the war-
ship in 1917. Many of our schools are still struggling, and some have
indeed run aground, while foundations continue to stockpile against
the future.75 Perhaps it is time for Congress to assume more control
over its money.
IV
AN INCENTIVE APPROACH
Present statutory provisions exact too many needless promises in
exchange for too great a tax break. In return for almost complete ex-
emption from taxation, the Code demands that an organization promise
that it will be "organized and operated exclusively" for certain named
charitable purposes.76 This means that the organization promises to
refrain from fulfilling purposes other than those so named. The Code
also prohibits causing any of the net earnings to inure "to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual." 77 Implied from these
74 Perhaps more important than the possibility of bias in favor of perpetuity is the
large degree to which our future charitable needs depend upon how successfully we cope
with present needs. Today's areas of need were areas of need in the nineteenth century
and will be such in the twenty-first century. Even those that seem new, such as problems
of the environment, really are old problems just being recognized. Many of these problems
would not exist today if we had solved their predecessors yesterday.
75 See Hearings pt. 5, at 1814-15.
76 CODE § 501(c)(S).
77 Id.
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promises is a more general promise to refrain from using the tax bene-
fits in ways that would inure to the detriment of others.
The abuses, therefore, can be separated into two categories: un-
desirable benefits and undesirable detriments. If the organization con-
fers a benefit made possible by its tax exemption upon persons who are
not true charitable objects, this is an abuse whether or not others are
directly hurt thereby. Such persons normally receive benefits because
of their status as insiders, that is, as large donors, foundation managers,
employees of foundations, suppliers, or others dealing with founda-
tions.78 Undesirable benefits may also be conferred upon employees,
relatives, and friends of such persons.
Other abuses result in detriments to persons who would benefit
if the organization's charitable activities were properly carried out.
Such persons include true charitable beneficiaries who do not re-
ceive their rightful benefits, taxable competitors of the organization,
or, in a more general sense, taxpayers whose money is being misspent.
The abuses in both categories can generally be associated with
the performance of the three proper functions of an intermediary: the
receipt of donations, the management of donated properties and of the
income therefrom, and the charitable distribution of such properties
and income.79 Only the abuses which are made possible or made easier
by the tax laws themselves, however, should be subject to control by
those tax laws.80 Thus, in exploring these abuses it is relevant to ask:
(1) whether they are presently being handled in a satisfactory manner;
(2) whether the conduct presently deemed abusive would continue to
be deemed so if the proposal herein were adopted; (3) whether the
proposal, without added restraints, would remove the advantages from
such abusive conduct; and (4) whether the proposal would create new
opportunities for abuse.
A. The Statutory Dilemma
Realizing that a complete job of curbing abuses is impossible
under the current statute, Congress has attacked only the most serious
abuses and, wherever possible, directed its attack toward only those
78 See generally HousE SELFr COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 19.
79 It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt a survey of all such abuses. The
purpose of this section is merely to demonstrate that the present requirements and pro-
hibitions approach is inherently unworkable. For this purpose, the main focus will be
upon the most recent legislative effort-the excise taxes enacted as part of the 1969 Tax
Reform Act. See CODE §§ 4940-48, added by ch. 83 Stat. 498-518.
80 This statement is true only if one agrees with the conclusion that nontax abuses
should be policed by states or by donors through lawsuits or decreased giving.
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organizations that have been the most blatant violators.,, Congress has
shifted from primary reliance upon the courts to enforce broad statu-
tory provisions, toward specific objective provisions that any court
would be hard-pressed to ignore.
A dilemma has thus been created.82 On the one hand it has long
been clear that general statutes are simply not sufficient to force the
courts to clamp down on foundations. Yet, because the more recent
statutory provisions were drafted in objective form, the courts have
been forced to steer a rigid middle course, permitting both unavoidable
loopholes and areas of overkill.
Congress could further expand the number of statutory provi-
sions to cover a greater number of variations, but the resultant regula-
tions would be unmanageable and would defeat the original objec-
tive of the charitable deduction. Some have charged that Congress has
already expanded the provisions too far.83 Most would concede that we
are at least near the breaking point. The problems of underkill and
overkill created by this dilemma must either be blindly tolerated or
a new beginning must be sought.
1. The Donation
Probably the most obvious example of the statutory dilemma is
the treatment of transactions between the charitable organization and
certain related persons. Prior to 1950, the only sanction available
against a charitable organization which transferred some of its exemp-
tion benefits to its creator, substantial contributors, or foundation
managers was the total denial of exempt status.84 The courts were re-
luctant to enforce this sanction. Violations were very difficult to un-
cover.
81 See, e.g., CODE §§ 4940-48.
82 See Hearings pt. 1, at 140 (statement of Professor L. Stone): "So you immedi-
ately start out with the dilemma of how do you control abuses without defeating your
very purpose [of avoiding governmental control of project selection of direct governmental
expenditures]." But Professor Stone then passes up a chance to re-examine basic policy:
"I begin with the strong condusion that the continued healthy existence of most of our
exempt organization area is a vital matter to our free pluralistic society." Id. He con-
centrates instead on suggestions for more statutory "fine tuning":
[f]n view of the large amounts of money involved in the tax benefits granted to
these organizations and their donors and in view of the extremely current pressing
needs for Government revenues, it seems to me that many benefits that were
granted decades ago to certain nonprofit organizations must be revised and in
some cases removed.
Id. at 141.
88 See Hearings pt. 1, 81-82 (statement of M. Pattillo, Jr., President Emeritus, The
Foundation Center).
84 See CODE § 501(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (1959).
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In 1950, Congress added to the Code section 503 which provided
that a section 501(c)(3) organization would lose its tax-exempt status
for at least one year for engaging in any of the specified non-arm's-
length "prohibited transactions" with certain insiders. This section
proved difficult to enforce, however, partly because of the severity of
the sanction and partly because the specified transactions were in-
sufficiently concrete to catch other than the most obvious abuses.s5 The
sanction, moreover, applied only to privately supported organizations
other than churches, schools, and hospitals.
Beginning in 1970, this section was replaced (as it related to sec-
tion 501(c)(3) organizations) with section 4941,88 which has expanded
the types of prohibited transactions to include many which are dearly
arm's-length. The section now applies only to nonoperating private
foundations.
In judging section 4941, one should remember that the oppor-
tunity for self-dealing probably is present both in' the management
function of any organization and in nearly any donation of property
of high value. Thus the statute clearly does not go far enough toward
eliminating this area of abuse.
On the other hand, as measured by the above definition of abuse,87
the section operates too severely upon private foundations. Arm's-
length sales, exchanges, leases, or uses of the charity's property are
prohibited if the foundation is dealing with a substantial contributor
or foundation manager (or with some other "disqualified person") 8
Also prohibited are sales at arm's-length or at bargain prices by dis-
qualified persons to their foundations, and the leasing of properties
by such persons to foundations without charge.89 These provisions
were thought necessary primarily because it had become too difficult
to distinguish between arm's-length and non-arm's-length trans-
actions."" The prohibition of donations made by disqualified persons,
if the foundation assumes a mortgage or even takes subject to a recent
mortgage, clearly cuts down on desirable flexibility in charitable giv-
ing.91 Prohibition of loans to private foundations from disqualified
persons also eliminates a method of advancing charitable donations to
85 See generally Hearings Before the Senate Fin. Comm. on the Tax Reform Act of
1969 (Statements and Recommendations of the Dep't of the Treas.), 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
pt. 1 (1969).
86 See CODE § 4941(d).
87 See p. 329 supra.
88 CODE § 4941(d). For the definition of "disqualified person," see id. § 4946(a).
89 Id. §§ 4941(d)(1)(A), (2)(C).
90 See Senate Fin. Comm. Hearings, supra note 85, pt. 1, at 12.
91 CODE § 4941(d)(2)(A). .
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earlier dates.92 Even interest free loans are prohibited unless the pro-
ceeds are used for section 501(c)(3) purposes.93 This last requirement
seems to have been ignored in the proposed regulations interpreting
section 4941.94 Does "used" mean that the principal must be disbursed
or merely invested? If it must be disbursed, then how soon? Again,
the furnishing of goods, services, or facilities to the organization is
prohibited. This provision would seem to prohibit most donations in
kind. The furnishing of such items without charge, moreover, is per-
mitted only if the items are, as with loans, used solely for section
501(c)(3) purposes.95
This provision also would prohibit disqualified persons from
furnishing (except without charge) necessary management services
such as investment and legal advice were it not for a subsection which
permits the private foundation to pay compensation for services reason-
able and necessary for the discharge of its exempt purpose if the
amount is not excessive.96 Although these two paragraphs of the pro-
posed regulations seem contradictory, read together they at least pro-
hibit paying for services in connection with unrelated business income.
In fact, a disqualified person could not render such services even for
free.97
Finally, section 4941 prohibits any transaction or use of income or
assets which directly or indirectly benefits a disqualified person. At best
this catchall is a trap for the unwary; at worst it brings back all of the
pre-1969 Tax Reform Act problems. Several examples in the proposed
regulations show how confusing this area has been. The proposed regu-
lations differentiate between "incidental or tenuous" benefits which
are acceptable and other more substantial benefits which are not.98
Section 4941(e)(3) talks of correction of these abuses by the application
of "the highest fiduciary standards." If this is interpreted as a definition
of what constitutes an abuse in the first instance, then the statute will
92 If a donor wished to make a contribution in a year when his adjusted gross income
was inadequate to permit a full deduction, it was common to loan the property to the
foundation and then to forgive the loan over a period of several years. The five year
carryover for excess gifts to preferred charities is of some help with this problem. See id.
§ 170(d). This and other drawbacks apparently were thought by the Treasury Department
to be unavoidable. See Senate Fin. Comm. Hearings, supra note 85, pt. 1, at 12-13.
A reading of the arguments for and against the various proposals demonstrates the statu-
tory dilemma created by Congress.
93 CODE § 4941(d)(2)(B).
94 See Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(c)(2), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,971 (1971).
95 CODE § 4941(d)(2)(C).
96 Id. § 4941(d)(2)(E).
97 _d. §§ 4941(d)(1), (2)(C).
98 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,972 '(1971).
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have come full circle and will have returned to the most ancient of
common law criteria governing insider conduct, "fiduciary duty."
The main point, however, is that these problems cannot be
corrected without the addition of even more detailed and specific
statutory language; yet, the more detailed and specific that this lan-
guage becomes, either through litigation or legislation, the more
detrimental the overall effect.
None of this would be necessary under the proposal advocated
herein. If an organization is not tax-exempt, abuse of a tax exemption
would, of course, be impossible. For example, the passing through of
tax exemption advantages to disqualified persons by direct sales, loans,
or leases at rates which are at arm's-length to the private foundation
but are more favorable to disqualified persons are now prohibited
because of competition with taxable persons. Nontax benefits such as
the use of foundation property as security for loans to disqualified
persons and the holding or voting of property for the benefit of dis-
qualified persons as well as more blatant forms of abuse still would
occur. These activities would still constitute abuses, but under the
proposal the taxpayers' dollars would not be involved. As a result,
those still interested, such as donors or state governments, would them-
selves have to carry the enforcement burden.
2. The Management Function
In 1954, Congress imposed taxes at regular rates on unrelated
business income,9 9 and, in 1969, an excise tax relating to excess busi-
ness holdings was enacted.100 Congress was worried about two things:
the use of the tax exemption to compete unfairly with taxable com-
petition, and the use of foundations to control businesses and thus
to shelter large amounts of taxable income. It is not clear, however,
whether business activities by foundations are considered improper
per se. Some have suggested that substantial involvement in non-
charitable activities would take up too much of a foundation manager's
time and divert his attention from charitable goals.' 01 A similar argu-
ment could be made, however, with regard to the management of a
"passive" investment portfolio.
The related-unrelated dichotomy as a method of defining what
income shall be subjected to regular taxation is unfair to those who
compete with tax-exempt related businesses. This dichotomy, more-
99 CODE §§ 511-14.
100 Id. § 4943.
101 Senate Fin. Comm. Hearings, supra note 85, pt. 1, at 15-16.
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over, has proved difficult to administer.102 The proposal would continue
to aid in the procurement of capital for related businesses but would
end the tax exemption for income earned by such businesses. A chari-
table contributions credit could be taken by such businesses, of course,
to the same extent available to other taxable competitors.
Sections 511-14 and, to a greater degree, section 4943 are also
directed at preventing excessive sheltering of taxable income. This
stems from a fear that the economic and political power of foundations
might grow to gigantic proportions with the aid of the exemption and,
consequently, that federal revenues might be depleted. 03 The proposal
would eliminate some of the present aid to inordinate growth. The char-
itable contributions credit would be available, however, when properties
were used to purchase related capital assets. This would aid growth,
but only that growth related to charitable programs and not growth
merely resulting in larger foundations per se. The intermediary would
not be aided by the tax statutes since the charitable contributions
credit would be available only for operating or disbursing activities.
This is as it should be. Far from fearing growth in these areas, the
sponsors of the deduction originally intended it to facilitate such
growth. 04
102 Examples of such related businesses include educational testing services, hospital
diagnostic services, research and testing businesses, university presses, and proprietary
educational institutions.
Code § 513 throws the ball to the Treasury and to the courts by defining "unrelated
trade or business" as "any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially
related" to its exempt purpose. In C.F. Mueller Co., 55 T.C. 275 (1970), the Tax Court
denied a charitable deduction claimed by a company for contributions to an exempt trust
for the benefit of New York University Law School. The company was deemed to be
owned beneficially by the University.
The Ford Foundation in 1966 and 1967 reportedly lost $92,500 and $100,000 respec-
tively by charging low prices in a cafeteria and dining room in its New York City office
building. Taxable competition thus lost over 300 regular customers. The Rockefeller
Foundation, according to the report, incurred losses of about one half of these amounts
in a similar operation. Hearings pt. 1, at 15 (remarks of Representative W. Patman).
103 See generally Hearings pt. 14, at 5326-31 (general explanation by Treas. Dep't).
104 With regard to the sheltering of income, Code § 514, the Clay Brown provision,
deserves some mention. The abuse here, first condoned by the Supreme Court (see Com-
missioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965)) and then condemned by Code § 514 (introduced
in the 1969 Tax Reform Act), involved the purchase of corporate stock at a more favorable
price than the seller would be able to obtain from a taxable buyer. This was accompanied
by a liquidation following the stock purchases and a lease back of the assets to a new
corporation owned by the old stockholders. The original stock was purchased wholly on
credit and the payments on this debt consisted of a return of most of the rents received
under the lease.
Because this resulted in a shift of some of the tax exemption advantages to taxable
persons and made it far too easy to purchase on credit and then shelter the resulting
income, this practice was outlawed. That portion of the rental income which bears the
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3. The Distribution Function
Code section 4944 prohibits a private foundation from investing
"any amount in such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any
of its exempt purposes."' 05 The legislative history of this section shows
that congressional intent was to discourage speculative investments. 06
The section could also be applied, however, to discourage all long-term
investments. The section is directed to the failure to exercise ordinary
business care and prudence with regard to the long- and short-term
financial needs of the foundation to carry out its exempt purposes. 07
These needs may include "the expected return, the risks of rising and
falling price levels, and the need for diversification." 108
This brief summary demonstrates the dilemma created by Congress
in enacting the present statute. Section 4944 may prove inadequate
because of its application only to private foundations and because of
the relatively low penalty taxes of from five percent to twenty-five
percent, the exclusion of certain investments, and the failure to pro-
vide for a continuing review of the portfolio. In other respects the
section may be too harsh, causing foundation managers to shy away
from some arguably sound investments because of the risk of being
second-guessed. As a practical matter, these abuses can never be totally
eliminated. Moreover, the examples of prohibited investments do not
allow flexibility depending upon whether the investments are or are
not related to the charitable programs of the foundation involved.
same ratio to the rental income as does the debt to the basis of the property is deemed
"unrelated business income" and taxed. CODE § 514. In a market dominated by taxable
persons, the purchase potential of exempt organizations would be unlimited. Although
§ 514 did close this loophole, the proposal herein would place charitable organizations on
even ground with other taxpayers and thus would eliminate the opportunity for this abuse
without having to restrict other, perhaps desirable, credit purchases as is presently the case.
105 CODE § 4944(a)(1).
106 See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1969).
107 Id. at 45-46.
106 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i), 36 Fed. Reg. 12,026 (1971).
The proposed regulations would not, however, place upon foundation managers a
continuing duty to review investments once made and determined as of that time to be
proper. Id. Two examples in the proposed regulations would prohibit substantial invest-
ments in common stock of (1) a corporation with no dividend record, some profit years
and some substantial loss years, and serious under-capitalization--even with a promising
product, and (2) a corporation with a heavy reliance on a new product that must compete
with products in a well-established alternative market and the stock of which is classified
as a high risk investment. Id. § 53.4944-1(c), 36 Fed. Reg. 12,026 (1971). Program invest-
ments are excluded by § 4944(c), and investments received by donations or in tax free
reorganizations are excluded by the regulations. Id. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 12,026
(1971). Apparently the statutory basis for this Proposed Regulation is that there has been
no amount "invested" as required by Code § 4944(a)(1).
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Finally, the prohibitions apply equally to the investment of the private
share of donations and of the government's share.
This extra protection cannot be justified by the government's
interest in protecting the tax laws from abuse. The proposed credit
would not automatically eliminate the possibility of speculative or
long-term investments which jeopardize charitable spending or pro-
grams by reducing current income or liquidity. It would, however,
eliminate the government's interest in seeing that its own revenues
are not subjected to such abuses, since government revenues would
not be made available for any investments, speculative or not.
Protection for the private portion of donations would be left to
donors or state governments. For organizations other than private
foundations, the Code sanction against investments that jeopardize
the charitable function is effective only when the jeopardy becomes so
blatant that the organization ceases to be organized and operated for
charitable purposes. This virtually unworkable standard, which is
presently applicable to public charitable organizations, also would
become unnecessary if the proposal herein were adopted.
Section 4942, a further requirement applicable only to private non-
operating foundations, requires the distribution of at least six percent
of asset fair market value, or all income, within twelve months of the
year in which the income was earned. This section replaces former sec-
tion 504, which in general terms prohibited "unreasonable accumula-
tions" of income. 109 The sanction for violation of section 504 (loss of
exempt status for a minimum of one year) had proved unworkable.
Under the proposal, however, the government would have no
revenue at stake in desiring an early distribution of either income
or principal. Although the proposal would not serve as a strong in-
centive for early distribution, the present disincentive would be re-
moved.
Finally, an abuse may consist of distributions made to non-
charitable beneficiaries in derogation of the original intent of donors.
Rather than attempting to strip organizations of tax-exempt status or
to place a penalty tax upon them, such as that presently applicable to
private foundations under section 4945,110 the proposal would shift the
focus to a determination of what does qualify as a creditable contribu-
tion. It would reflect what has become clear over the years-that it is
109 See p. 321 supra.
110 Section 4945 prohibits expenditures by private foundations for certain political
purposes, for travel or study grants to individuals (unless 'made via a procedure approved
in advance), to other private foundations (unless supervised by the donor organization),
and "for any other purpose other than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B)."
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particularly difficult to force anyone to be charitable if he does not de-
sire to be so, regardless of whether or not he has in the past made
promises to that effect.
It is probable, of course, that even if the proposal were adopted
some charitable organizations would still engage in noncharitable con-
duct and thus would continue to frustrate the intent of small donors. It
is also possible to try to stop these abuses through the Code. Experience
has shown, however, that the federal government is not well-suited to
this task. By assuming this duty, moreover, the federal government has
led others (states and private persons) toward complacency, a compla-
cency which has proven to be unjustified since the federal duty has
not always been adequately discharged.
B. Enforcement Problems
In addition to examining the statutory provisions designed to
control abuses, one must examine how these provisions have been im-
plemented in practice. The Internal Revenue Service, which has the
sole responsibility for enforcement, is hampered in two ways."' First,
it is asked to function as a policeman, a role foreign to its usual task
of seeing whether voluntary conduct has been properly reported. The
Service usually is concerned with whether the taxpayer did what he
says he did, and, if so, whether the proper tax has been paid. The
exempt organization provisions require the Service to inquire further
to see if the taxpayer did what he should have done. This requires an
immense amount of information about each organization. Until
recently, the Service received very sparse information through Form
990-A. A revised form now requires more information, but it in no way
approaches what would'be needed to do a complete job. Effective regu-
lation, moreover, requires that organizations fill out the form properly.
Unfortunately, in many cases they do not.112 If the abuse in question is
in violation of the Code and is intentional, it may safely be assumed
that the organization will try to conceal this on the form.
Second, the enforcement incentive to the Service is in some cases
too little and in others too great. Prior to 1969, section 504 carried the
loss of exempt status as the sanction for excess income accumulation.
ill Some harsh words have been written in recent years concerning the general lack
of effectiveness of Internal Revenue Service enforcement of the Code provisions in the exempt
organization area. Prior to the 1969 Tax Reform Act, the response was that the lack
of revenue potential to the government was the cause. It remains to be seen whether
adequate incentive now exists in the private foundation area. See, e.g., HousE SEnEr
COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 19, at 27-28; Hearings pt. 1, at 145, 150-51, 191.
112 See Hearings pt. 1, at 145.
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The Service found that the courts were reluctant to apply this severe
sanction. The result in most cases was no sanction at all, leading to a
lack of interest in Service enforcement. The 1969 Act incorporates a
new approach consisting of graduated penalties for conduct specifically
defined. Although this may be of some help, the fact remains that these
sanctions, as excise taxes, are really penal in nature. It is difficult to
prosecute for unintentional violations even if intent is immaterial
under the statute. Moreover, these excises rapidly become confiscatory
and thus may prove even more severe than the loss of exempt status
for a year.
Probably the most serious enforcement problem, however, is the
immense amount of noncompliance, not necessarily to cover up abuses,
but from what has been termed the "snicker" effect.113 Many founda-
tions realize that the Internal Revenue Service has neither the equip-
ment nor the financial incentive to police their conduct. Therefore, they
have been inclined to ignore, or to treat as so much governmental red
tape, such provisions as the technical reporting requirements, the re-
quirement of adherence to exclusive charitable purpose, and the prohibi-
tions against political involvement. Even some larger, better known
foundations have been accused of these types of violations." 4 This cir-
cumstance indicates that a basic premise of our tax philosophy-that
voluntary compliance will be achieved through a belief in the statute's
general fairness-is invalid in this area.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, the present approach to charitable exemptions and deduc-
tions is not working. To date, however, Congress has had no choice but
to stay with it or to abandon the conferment of tax benefits altogether
since it has been reluctant to meddle with the basic benefit of an ex-
emption for a promise.
A purist might argue that the government ought to go all the way
and eliminate all Code incentives for charitable giving and replace
them with a grant program."15 Even then, however, the grant should
be paid not for a promise but for action. This is substantially what
the proposed charitable contributions credit would do, but with several
1a See T. HvruNm, supra note 4, at 50.
114 See HousE SELECr COMM. ON SMALL BUsNESS, supra note 19, at 12.
11S The Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy. Edwin S. Cohen, is reported
to have urged the total elimination of the charitable contributions deduction on the
ground that it is "unrelated to the receipt of income." Wall St. J., June 2, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
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important differences: by placing the incentive in the Code and making
it automatic, not only will bureaucratic decision making be reduced
and certainty increased to the donor and intermediary, but the desir-
able separation or plurality of management would be preserved."i 6
If it was not clear before, it should be clear from our experience
since the 1969 Tax Reform Act that the present "requirements" ap-
proach to enforcing good behavior by foundations will not be success-
ful. An incentive approach is suggested as an alternative. But a most
important point is that the two suggested policy changes are tied
together. Whatever desirability the incentive approach may have, it is
impossible to implement unless it is accompanied by a limitation of tax
benefits to current charitable spending. That is, if the incentive is not
triggered by an actual expenditure rather than a promise, there will
remain the problem of how to police the organization between the
time the tax benefit is granted and the time the charitable expenditure
takes place.
116 See generally Surrey, supra note 3. Professor Surrey does include the charitable
contributions deduction in his list of incentives that ought to be removed, but his analysis
indicates that the deduction is vulnerable on grounds that an incentive may not be needed
and that the rich benefit from it more than the poor. If these defects were corrected,
subsidies through automatic provisions in the Code would seem to be more desirable than
direct grants as the means to achieve managerial pluralism.
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